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대전 전투와 미군의 전투효율성 144 군사연구 제130집 (Abstract) Battle of Daejeon and Combat Effectiveness of the U.S. Forces - Park Il Song - The first United States' division into the Korean War was the 24th Infantry Division, which had been in occupation mission in Japan since the end of World War Ⅱ. The division continued retreating from the beginning; Osan, Pyeongtaek- Anseong, Chonan, Jeonui-Jochiwon, Gongju, Daepyeongni, and Daejeon. It's main mission was to stop in some point the North Korean forces with delaying action. The division, however, met a severe blow at Daejeon and stopped temporarily as a fighting unit. Even though it is now clear that the major factor for its loss of Daejeon is the lack of forces against the North Koreans, this explanation seems to be too simplistic. Using an approach of 'combat effectiveness,' one could answer what happened and how the Americans fought at Daejeon more accurately. Among other factors, leadership, intelligence, firepower and maneuver, control and communication, and training has been selected for the factors of combat power. And, contrary to the common understanding of lack of leadership among regimental and divisional commanders as the key factor for failure, the division's leadership was as normal as other divisions. Instead, other factors influenced battle performance of the division more than leadership. Special mention should be given to training. The division and others too has been indifferent to training during the peace time and forgot what should be main effort as military units. Making a fighting unit is not, and has not been easy task, but this is an common wisdom that should not be forgotten in the peace time. Key words : Battle of Daejeon, Firepower and Maneuver, Intelligence, Combat Capability, Leadership, Control and Communication